ARCHITECTS REGISTRATION BOARD

THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE

HELD AT

CLIFFORDS INN CONFERENCE CENTRE

CLIFFORDS INN

FETTER LANE

LONDON EC4A 1LD

ON

THURSDAY, 3RD MARCH 2005

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Present:

Mr Michael Williams (Chair)

Ms Linda Read

Mr Stephen Brookhouse

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IN THE MATTER OF

MR STEPHEN MANSHIP (060199C)

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MR IAN MILLER (of Messrs Wright, Son & Pepper) appeared on behalf of the Architects Registration Board.

MR RICHARD HALLAM (of Messrs Claude, Hornby & Cox) appeared on behalf of the Defendant.

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(Transcribed by Harry Counsell & Co)

Cliffords Inn , Fetter Lane , London , EC4A 1LD

Tel: 020 7269 0370

Facsimile: 020 7831 2526

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DECISION

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THE CHAIR: We have been greatly assisted in this case, both by the helpful explanation of Mr Miller on behalf of the Board and by the helpful and lengthy submissions that Mr Hallam has made on behalf of Mr Manship. We have considered, in coming to our decision, both the supporting references, which are very full and paint a clear picture of Mr Manship's previous work and his social life. We have also specifically considered the four areas which Mr Hallam addressed us about in respect of Mr Manship - I refer to those as “his personal and architectural background” – the circumstances leading to the institution of criminal proceedings, the aftermath of the conviction and the nature and purpose of this hearing to which I will refer in a little more detail below.

There has been a full acceptance by Mr Manship of the nature of the offences and the criminal conviction, which has meant that there is unanimity about the circumstances relating to this case and the fact that there has been sufficient breach of the Code and of the Architects Act 1997. We have, in particular, been taken to the provisions of section 15(1)(b) where the nature of the conviction is taken into account as a matter constituting a breach of the Professional Code to which Mr Manship has to adhere as an architect. There is no dispute on that point.

We are also extremely alive to the fact that this is not meant to be a second punishment and we are not in any way seeking to impose a penalty or to double guess what the Judiciary has already imposed under the criminal law. We are acutely aware of the risks of double jeopardy and of the fact that (to use the phrase that has been incorporated in the papers) Mr Manship has paid his duty to society. Nonetheless, professions are jealous of their reputation and it goes on beyond merely the technical discharge of your duties. That is why this Tribunal exists and why there are disciplinary proceedings and Codes of Practice to which professionals have to adhere. I wish to make it clear that we have thought very carefully about how we go about this and we take the view that, unlike the criminal procedure to which Mr Manship has already been subjected, there is no tariff. We are not tied by a particular framework as to what has to be done or not done. We have, therefore, looked at every case on its merits, having considered both the documentation and the submissions on behalf of the Board and on Mr Manship's behalf. The case which seems to us to be seminal so far as this Tribunal is concerned is the one to which our attention has been helpfully drawn. It is the seminal and well-known case of Bolton v The Law Society . Both Mr Miller, on behalf of the Board, and Mr Hallam have referred to this case and it is unnecessary for me to refer to it in much detail, other than to say that the ratio appears to be (and this is common ground, I think, between all of us) based on two principles; namely, in deciding what kind of penalty should be imposed, one looks at the likelihood of re-offending and the reputation of the profession. I propose to deal with each in turn, as did Mr Hallam in the submissions that he made on behalf of his client.

So far as the likelihood of re-offending is concerned, we have no primary evidence of this ourselves, of course, although we have written assurances on behalf of Mr Manship. We have no reason to assume that those assurances are other than completely justifiable and we accept them. We think that we are guided and helped by the decisions that the Judge made at the trial, Judge Connor. Although there is no specific reference to the supporting evidence which he would have seen before he made his decision, I think that we can take ordinary judicial note of the fact that there would have certainly been a detailed social inquiry report and there may well, in the nature of this case, have been a psychiatric report as well. Whatever those documents said, and they are not before us, plainly they did not appear to cause the Judge any concern so as to persuade him that he should have imposed some of the many additional penalties or protections which would have been available under the 1978 Act and to which Mr Hallam referred in his submissions. On that basis, therefore, I will say something in a little more detail about the impact of this particular offence on Mr Manship's future clients.

So far as the first of the two headings in Bolton v The Law Society are concerned, we do not believe that there is anything before us that would persuade us that there is any serious likelihood of re-offending. Anything can happen but it has not formed any significant part of the basis upon which we make an ultimate finding in this case.

As Mr Hallam has said, by far the most difficult issue and the one that is flagged up in Bolton v The Law Society is the question of the reputation of the profession. I have commented very briefly on that already. There are not large sections of the authority on which I seek to rely but there is one specific point which has been a very material factor in our considerations and to which I think I should specifically make reference in this judgment. At about the middle of page 519 of the Weekly Law Reports, 25th March 1994, it says, “It can never be an objection to an order for suspension in an appropriate case that the solicitor” – this says “solicitor”, but I think that we have agreed that it relates to all professionals – “may be unable to re-establish his practice when the period of suspension is passed. If that proves, or appears to be likely, to be the so consequence for the individual and his family may be deeply unfortunate and unintended” – and here is the principle which we have specifically taken into account – “but that does not make suspension the wrong order if it is otherwise right. The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but it is also part of the price.”

It seems to us that there are two possible approaches that we can take having borne in mind that very important decision by the then Master of the Rolls. That is how we go about deciding about what kind of penalty we should impose. We know that it must not be a second punishment. We either say in reflecting the views of society and of the particular profession (in this case the architects' profession) or the other side of that coin is the view of society and how it views the profession. In viewing that, we must take some account of the criminal framework because it provides some guidance. That is one approach. Therefore, in deciding the nature of the penalty that we would impose, whilst, as I made clear, there is no framework as such, nonetheless, in deciding which of the various penalties are open to us from a reprimand or, indeed, a finding of guilt but no enforcement at all right up to the question of erasure, whether we, too, would look to one of five steps. Whether we would take that kind of approach or whether we would start the matter absolutely ab initio, saying that there is a criminal conviction, we take due note of the criminal conviction, we appreciate that society will be aware of the criminal conviction and that the professional will, therefore, be subject to it. But, putting that on one side, so to speak, we would then, as a Tribunal, look at which of the various penalties are available to us ab initio.

The view that we have taken is that the latter of these two approaches is the correct one for this Tribunal to take, precisely because we are not seeking to impose an extra punishment. What we are seeking to do is to protect the reputation of the profession and the way in which we protect the reputation of the profession, therefore, is to impose a penalty which, in our own view and in our judgment, from the diverse nature of the members of this Tribunal, we believe to be the appropriate penalty.

There is one other point to which I alluded before and which I think that I want to make specific reference to here. That is the impact on the clients. We do not think that it has a significant impact on the clients. There are issues of fitness and we take the matters seriously. We have taken into account the reference that the Judge has made to the fact that this offence is abhorrent to many members of the public, but we, equally, recognise that the skills and input of an architect are different from those of other professions and we do not believe that this activity, which plainly took place outside of his ordinary professional working life, should impact in any way on his clients or mean that Mr Manship, at any stage in the future, would give a poorer service as an architect. Therefore, it has not been a factor that we have taken into account in deciding penalty.

I now come to the penalty that this Tribunal has decided that it should impose. For reasons which we have said already - and we take into account the comments of the trial Judge amongst other things in forming our view here – this is a serious matter and it is something which both the profession and the public would regard as a serious matter and we have to reflect this in the penalty which we impose. However, we have also taken into account the fact that Mr Manship has not been working for a year. I wish to make it clear that, if this matter had come on to this Tribunal immediately the circumstances had been brought to their attention, which, for the purposes of this judgment, I have to make clear that they absolutely could not have done because the procedure that was adopted in this case was wholly correct - plainly the criminal proceedings had to be completed before this matter did come on and Mr Manship then had to serve a period of imprisonment … Nonetheless, we do believe that we are properly entitled to take into account the fact that he has not been able to work in the profession for a year and he would not have been in a position, realistically, to work as a fully-qualified architect at any stage beyond March 2004, when he ceased to do so. De facto, he has had a year when he has not been in the swim of his professional practice.

If that had not happened, we would have imposed the maximum of a two-year sentence. Given that that has happened, we are proposing to impose a period of suspension of a further 18 months, which will run from today.